

To render time sensible: transmissibility

Review of:

Keith Moxey, *Visual Time: The Image in History*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2013, 207 pp., 8 col. plates, 21 b. & w. illus., \$89.85 hdbk, \$24.95 pbk, Hardback ISBN 978-0-8223-5354-6, Paperback ISBN 978-0-8223-5369-0.

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Keith Moxey's *Visual Time: The Image in History* imagines itself as an art historical methodology when in fact it only rhetorically questions the discipline's 'epistemology certainty' about images and temporality. Moxey never enacts a methodology capable of confronting the complicated issues of temporality, images, and art historiography. Instead, he traipses through seven chapters on these issues that read more like transcriptions of conference talks than the in-depth work one expects in a book project. While Moxey offers convincing explanations of art historical shortcomings regarding an artwork's essential anachronism—for example, the simple fact that a work from 1907 is encountered anew, time and again, in each present, by new sets of viewers—he fails to arrive at either a method or a theoretical framework to address what he terms the '*anachronic power*' of an artwork. Nonetheless, this text astutely surveys much recent work on images and historiography. It does so by addressing pre-existing methodological issues such as linear chronology, ekphrasis, contemporaneity, and aesthetic experience.

The problem is that Moxey only flirts with theory in a text purportedly about images and time. This is baffling. How could a book purporting to rethink art history by focusing on the complex temporality enfolded within an aesthetic encounter refrain from fully engaging with Jacques Derrida's late work on photography and temporality, or Gilles Deleuze's quite famous theory of the time-image? I mention these figures not to assert that their work offers the only answers to the issues Moxey foregrounds. Quite the contrary. I mention these figures because Moxey chose to address this topic in a manner that reads like a kind of aristocratic overview, a survey of thought that never quite gets its hands dirty. Rhetorical questions and faint suggestions of a method abound in this text. But in the end, there is nothing like the critical and creative work found in Georges Didi-Huberman's *Confronting Images: Questioning the Ends of a Certain History of Art* (1990, 2005) or T. J. Demos' *Return to the Postcolony: Spectres of Colonialism in Contemporary*

Art (2013).¹ As Moxey writes of his own approach: ‘Instead of offering even tentative answers to these issues confronting the history of art today, these essays ally themselves with persistent questions’ (8).

I would argue that we are well aware of the questions facing the history of art. The problem is that we persist in the same historiographic mode despite theoretical challenges and the creation of new artworks. What remains to be done is to create an art historical mode capable of encountering an artwork as a material-force, as a mode of transmissibility wherein art historians could grasp that an event is dated (it takes on a consistency in a specific past) even as it continues to produce effects into the future, effects that alter and change the past. This would be to *creatively involve* ourselves with an ontology of the work of art as a temporal passage. It would be an art history truly capable of thinking thresholds and passages, becoming and history—a diagrammatic art history wherein art history becomes a theory-practice of multiplicities, a practice more aligned with Spinozist joy than historicist melancholy.²

Moxey articulates the motivating problematic he desired to confront in his book here: ‘The aesthetic power of works of art, the fascination of images and their capacity to shape our response in the present, argues against treating them as if they were simply documents of particular historical horizons’ (137). Of course, Moxey is correct to identify this fundamental art historical paradox as a problematic. The longstanding art historical desire to fabricate a linear, historical narrative into which all of the world’s artworks could be catalogued and ordered is a cultural and political symptom of modernity as such.³ By setting out to address ‘the temporal constructs erected to account for the history of visual objects and their inherent temporal potential’, Moxey quickly realizes that a single chronology for the history of art is untenable, if not unethical (1). Instead, heterogeneous temporalities explode across the art historical night sky, like so many of Bruegel’s opaque crows traversing the winter sky in *The Return of the Hunters*. It is in a chapter entitled ‘Bruegel’s Crows’ that Moxey presents the best iteration of the work he has undertaken.

By taking Bruegel as a case study and then carefully laying out the historiography on him, Moxey arrives at the crux of his problematic:

¹ Moxey does cite Didi-Huberman’s work several times throughout his text, but he never specifically outlines where he sees Didi-Huberman’s work on images, temporality, and his Warburgian critique of Panofsky’s form of art history as faltering or coming up short. It seems Moxey needed to address Didi-Huberman’s brilliant chapter ‘The History of Art Within the Limits of Its Simple Practice’ from *Confronting Images* to distinguish his own work on the same terrain. See my review of *Demos* in *caa.reviews*, Fall 2014.

² On ‘Spinozist joy’, see my piece, co-written with Donald Preziosi, ‘Kunstgriff: Art as Event, Not Commodity’, with Donald Preziosi, *Esse: Arts + Opinions* special volume *Taking a Stance*, v. 85, Fall 2015: 7-11.

³ See Donald Preziosi, *Brain of the Earth’s Body: Art, Museums, and the Phantasms of Modernity*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003.

To reduce its [Bruegel's *Christ Carrying the Cross*] reception to the historical horizon in which it was executed overlooks the fascination it provokes in our own time—the continuing exchange of looks that marks the encounter between spectator and image. By what means does the work insist on the creation of new meaning as it rolls through time? Art historical writing cannot mortify the work by reducing it to the textual status of history. If it no longer engages our sensations as well as our intellect, we would have no occasion to speak about it. In the absence of a vital and ongoing engagement with the work in the present, its “work” comes to an end. (90)

Moxey calls for an art historical method that would be ‘a vital and ongoing engagement with the work in the present’. This mode of ‘engagement’ would be capable of tracing the lines of becoming running between a work’s specific historical context and later futural encounters with it.

Moxey also posits that contemporary art and the discourse of contemporaneity, including the silly notion that we are now ‘posthistorical’, only avoid the complex relations between artworks and temporality. ‘If historicism’s “grand narrative” has been discarded, so, it seems, has the incentive to understand anything but the recent past’, he writes (38). He wonders if the ‘presentism of historical writing’ forecloses on attempting to understand ‘the deep past’. The issue here is Moxey’s acceptance of an oversimplified narrative, one that has structured the discourse on contemporary art. While there may have been a desire to overcome historical ‘grand narratives’, the brutal fact is that Jean-Francois Lyotard’s theoretical work was reduced to replacing these ‘grand narratives’ with ‘little’ ones. The explosion of ‘little narratives’ that marks much contemporary art from the 1980s until today is a result of wilful oversimplifications of art theory and the absence of a conceptual framework capable of encountering the aesthetic-historiographic force of an artwork.⁴ But rather than critiquing the discourse of contemporary art, Moxey retreats to even more unhelpful questions: ‘Have we run out of time, or has time come to an end?...Has the meaning of time changed so radically that we no longer require its enveloping presence? Even if time is always a figment of our imaginations, do we not still need it?’ (39). When Moxey asks if we have ‘run out of time’ or if time is ‘always a figment of our imaginations’, one realizes that his failure to present us with a theory of time has consequences for the entire text. This failure explains the egregious absence of any discussion of Deleuze on the time-image,

⁴ A move in this direction is signaled by Christoph Menke’s *Force: A Fundamental Concept of Aesthetic Anthropology*, translated by Gerrit Jackson, New York: Fordham University Press, 2013.

which, in turn, would have made Moxey confront Bergsonian time.⁵ Deleuze explains how and why temporality becomes ontologically and ethically visible through the construction and reception of time- and movement-images. Surely any attempt on Moxey's part to deal with Deleuze as more than a theoretical artefact, as more than a name in a list of post-structuralist thinkers summarized in a mere paragraph or two, would have undoubtedly benefitted the subject of his book.⁶

Perhaps Moxey's inability to engage with aesthetic theory stems from his assumption that he 'need not rehearse the criticisms that have shaken this philosophy of history' (24). He assumes his readers will understand that critical theory in the 1960s-1990s was undertaken in large part to dismantle a philosophy of history structured around modern notions of continuity and progress. But it is necessary to 'rehearse the criticisms' because these lessons have not been fully learned, especially if one is willing to reduce Foucault's work, for instance, to 'a vision of the past marked by rupture and discontinuity', as Moxey does.⁷ It becomes evident that Moxey's contention that poststructuralist theory is only about the 'linguistic turn'—language as the primary structural field in which we understand ourselves and the world—blinds him to the conceptual richness that develops in such work. It is not coincidence that Derrida, Deleuze, Kristeva, and others all end up writing about representation, history, and temporality in their last texts. These thinkers turn their attention precisely to the threshold between seeing and speaking, statements and visibilities, images and language. Moxey notes the impossibility of saying what we see—he calls it 'translation' throughout the book—

⁵ See Emerling, "An Art Historical Return to Bergson," *Bergson and the Art of Immanence*, edited by John Mullarkey and Charlotte de Mille, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013, pp. 260-271.

⁶ Moxey misreads French poststructuralism, or, at least minimally, Deleuze's work within that set of thinkers, as only about language. 'The intervening layer of language on which understanding depends denies the physical presence of the work a function in the process of interpretation', he writes (59). This is a far too cursory and myopic summary of French poststructuralism as it relates to overcoming phenomenology and modern philosophies of history.

⁷ Moxey, p. 24. Another insistence of a glaring omission would be Moxey only dealing with Walter Benjamin's essay "On the Mimetic Faculty" because his chapter is entitled "Mimesis and Iconoclasm" rather than developing Benjamin's brilliant analyses of how history 'decomposes into images', that is, past images that only become readable (*Lesbarkeit*) in certain future contexts. This concept directly relates to Benjamin's famous concept of the 'dialectical image'. Benjamin discusses the historical index of images which become readable at particular moments: 'For the historical index of the images not only says that they belong to a particular time; it says, above all, that they attain to legibility [*Lesbarkeit*] only at a particular time...The image that is read—which is to say, the image in the now of its recognizability [*im Jetzt der Erkennbarkeit*—bears to the highest degree the imprint of the perilous critical moment on which all reading is founded'. See Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, translated by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. 462-3.

in the sections on ekphrasis, but he misses the opportunity to theorize the threshold, the gap between sensible and intelligible, that opens between vision and language. This threshold or non-place within history is what Foucault called a diagram.

A diagram is a concept that offers us insight into artworks and our aesthetic encounters with them. Instead of conceiving of an artwork as a historical artefact, we should think of it as a diagram, that is, as a material-force that functions. A diagram is not simply 'an auditory or visual archive but a map, a cartography that is coextensive with the whole social field'.⁸ Redefining an artwork as a diagram allows us to conceive it as a 'spatio-temporal multiplicity', as Deleuze explains of Foucault's concept. Here is Deleuze explicating the importance of Foucault's concept of the diagram in terms that should have piqued Moxey's attention:

Every diagram is intersocial and constantly evolving. It never functions in order to represent a persisting world but produces a new kind of reality, a new model of truth. It is neither the subject of history, nor does it survey history. It makes history by unmaking preceding realities and significations, constituting hundreds of points of emergence or creativity, unexpected conjunctions or improbable continuums. It doubles history with a sense of continual evolution.⁹

Conceiving an artwork as a diagram, in turn, demands a diagrammatic art history, one capable of grasping how and why an artwork 'acts as a non-unifying immanent cause that is coextensive with the whole social field' and not simply an effect of an underlying socio-historical cause.¹⁰ The diagram is an immanent becoming within time itself. Historically things take on a consistency, becoming visible and intelligible within certain structural contexts. But an artwork is what it does: it takes on a consistency, becomes visible, but it works to transmit a relation to the future.

Moreover, the time of an artwork is always the temporality of a sense-event: it is a conjunction of past-future that deframes the historical present with other becomings, composing other lines of time within it. For this reason a diagram is a 'non-place' or temporal passage within history. To grasp the artwork as a diagram we need to understand time as that which has no other mode of being than to coexist in its entirety with each passing present, thereby differentiating itself as it is actualized anew, time and again. Thus an artwork is not just an instance of the past within the present, but it is an opening within time itself.

If an artwork is an opening within time as such, it is because it takes place in the disjunction between speaking and seeing, between past and future. As Foucault reminds us: 'what we see never lies in what we say' and vice versa. When Deleuze

⁸ Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, translated by Seán Hand, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988, p. 34.

⁹ Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 35.

¹⁰ Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 37.

read this insight he understood that the most complex and vital disjunctions between seeing and speaking—the most creative aesthetic diagrams —were to be found in cinematic images. His two books on cinema demonstrate how cinema thinks temporally by constructing various forms of images.¹¹ The key aspect of these books is that Deleuze’s theory of time remains a lesson that far too many art historians, including Moxey, have yet to learn.

Let us read only a single insight from Deleuze and see if we can follow this line of thought to get at something essential about art and temporality. Deleuze writes: ‘What is in the present is whatever the image “represents,” but not the image itself. The image itself is a bunch of temporal relations from which the present unfolds...Temporal relations are never seen in ordinary perception, but they can be seen in the image, provided the image is creative. The image renders visible...the temporal relations which cannot be reduced to the present’.¹² Thus an image is a temporal diagram. It ‘renders visible temporal relations which cannot be reduced to the present’. This ontological and aesthetic mode of art demands a method capable of encountering this diagrammatic, immanent becoming—in other words, transmissibility.

For me, transmissibility is an approach to art and history that gets at the complications of temporality, immanent movement, and the creation of sense-events that comprise the most vital artworks. I define transmissibility as a mode of an artwork and as a critical aim of art historical work. Transmissibility shuttles us between aesthetic labour (creation, research, performance) and cultural reception (exhibition, historiography, criticism). It posits that ontologically and aesthetically an artwork traces the lines of time that deframe and compose the present. Transmissibility, therefore, has nothing to do with representing the cultural past. Instead, it has everything to do with a temporal deframing of any cultural representation *and* with the composition of other temporalities (modes of culture) within the present. Transmissibility requires us to rethink art history as a diagrammatic practice capable of encountering the artwork as a futural force and not a Hegelian ‘thing of the past’. As a futural force, an artwork immanently creates ontological, ethical, and epistemic effects, if only because it reveals how and why varying temporalities and hence different becomings are immanently enfolded within each supposed discrete tense (past, present, future).

Following Deleuze and Guattari, the aim here is to conceive of an artwork as a two-fold, diagrammatic operation: it *deframes* the present, meaning it undoes the

¹¹ Deleuze, *Cinema I: The Movement-Image*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986, and *Cinema II: The Time-Image*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.

¹² This statement is from the extraordinary interview Deleuze gave to *Cahiers du Cinéma* in 1986. See ‘The Brain is The Screen’, *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995*, edited by David Lapouade, translated by Anne Hodges and Mike Taormina, New York: Semiotext(e), 2007, p. 295.

actual discourse, precedent, received opinions, clichéd feelings and expressions, as it *composes* new lines and temporal linkages, new becomings. This simultaneous operation occurs because an artwork is not simply an historical object; instead, it is critical thought, a futural material-force. This function of deframing and composing occurs in time, opening us to a multiplicity of temporal durations (the internal difference of time itself). As such it opens us to unforeseen, affective sense-events—*material encounters that force us to think and to become.*

Here is Deleuze once more:

In becoming there is no past nor future – not even present, there is no history. In becoming it is, rather, a matter of involuting; it's neither regression nor progression. To become is to become more and more restrained, more and more simple, more and more deserted and for that very reason populated. This is what's so difficult to explain: to what extent one should involute...[because] experimentation is involutive.¹³

This mode of 'creative involution' is a connective thread running between Deleuze's work on Bergson to his concept of the fold. Becoming is 'a bit of time in its pure state', or a section of chaos captured by a formal net articulated by an artist: the fold or 'and' of the Joycean *chaosmos*.¹⁴

All of this leaves us with the ability to posit that an artwork is what it does: it renders new passages, new modes of becoming, between past and future. These passages are always *untimely* because they are *inherent* unhistorical lines of time that flow within the present.¹⁵ Transmissibility is the power of an artwork to deframe any cultural representation *and* to compose with other modes of culture. Transmissibility is this double movement, which creates aesthetic and historical encounters with singularities rather than subjects.¹⁶ Therefore, what is transmitted

¹³ Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues II*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, London and New York: Continuum, 2006, p. 22.

¹⁴ Joyce defined an artwork as a conjunction of cosmos and chaos, a 'chaosmos'. Deleuze refers to this Joycean neologism several times throughout his work. See Deleuze and Félix Guattari, "Percept, Affect, and Concept" in *What Is Philosophy?*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, pp. 163-199.

¹⁵ The 'untimely' is a concept Deleuze and Guattari develop from Nietzsche via Foucault; see *What Is Philosophy?*, pp. 112-13. See also Deleuze, *Foucault*, pp. 107-111, 119-123.

¹⁶ Deleuze: 'What is an ideal event? It is a singularity—or rather a set of singularities or of singular points characterizing a mathematical curve, a physical state of affairs, a psychological and moral person. Singularities are turning points and points of inflections; bottlenecks, knots, foyers, and centers; points of fusion, condensation, and boiling; points of tears and joy, sickness and health, hope and anxiety, "sensitive" points. Such singularities, however, should not be confused either with the personality of the one expressing herself in discourse, or with the individuality of the state of affairs...The singularity belongs to another

is not a given past or even a represented state of things or subject(s); instead, what is created is only an opening – a pure means – a new temporal relation of simultaneity and duration, a past-future (Aion) that ‘inheres’ within the present (Chronos), one comprised of ‘incorporeal effects’ that make ‘pre-individual and nonpersonal singularities’ sensible and intelligible.¹⁷ To think of transmissibility in this manner is to accept Deleuze’s philosophy of time and materiality.

Deleuze’s philosophy of time, of course, includes his elaboration of Bergson’s theory that time is not simply divisible into past, present, and future. There are no clearly differentiated temporal states, but only levels and degrees of temporal co-existence and transformation. Throughout his work Deleuze relies on Bergson’s concept of the ‘pure past’: that the entirety of all that has happened coexists with each present, that each present is the ‘contraction’ of this ‘pure past’, which itself is then reconfigured with every passing present.¹⁸ The past, therefore, is an immanent terrain, a field, ‘not just a reified version of the present’ because it is ‘searchable, explorable, problematizable, penetrable, and livable’.¹⁹ The force that surveys and animates the past is the future. Temporal movement is ‘untimely’ and open because the future is the desire to search the past and make different presents livable; it is the desire to actualize different configurations and effects in lieu of the present.

For Deleuze, an event is nothing other than a movement of becoming that traverses time immanently, repeating and thus differentiating the succession of past, present, and future anew. Within this movement, the future ‘defines an event *not* in the time-frame that it is in, but in another time-frame’ because it is ‘the forced communication of the present, past, and future of the same event’.²⁰ Of course, this ‘forced communication’ has ontological, ethical, and epistemic effects, if only because it reveals how and why varying temporalities are enfolded within each supposed discrete tense. However, the future is conceived as disjunctive, aleatory force: an outside that paradoxically exists at the most intimate interior of time as such because it ‘forces cracks in the stable set of past events to exhibit not-yet

dimension than that of denotation, manifestation, or signification. It is essentially pre-individual, non-personal, and a-conceptual. It is quite different to the individual and the collective, the personal and the impersonal, the particular and the general – and to their oppositions. Singularity is *neutral*. On the other hand, it is not “ordinary”: the singular point is opposed to the ordinary’. See *The Logic of Sense*, edited by Constantin V. Boundas, translated by Mark Lester, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, p. 52.

¹⁷ Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, p. 73; on Aion and Chronos, see p. 77.

¹⁸ See Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, New York, Zone Books, 1991. Note also his 1956 essay ‘Bergson’s Conception of Difference’, *Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974*, New York, Semiotext(e), 2004, pp. 32-51.

¹⁹ Jay Lampert, *Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of History*, London and New York, Continuum, 2011, p. 51.

²⁰ Lampert, p. 66.

determinate chance effects, and conversely forces the future to have shown itself, at least darkly, in its precursors'.²¹

My work on transmissibility stems from a desire to arrive at a philosophy of history capable of articulating the complex epistemic *and* aesthetic power of an artwork. In other words, an artwork as a material, expressive reality, a conjunction of content and expression, statement and visibility, sensible and intelligible. It remains to us as art historians to think a philosophy of history wherein artworks embody transmissibility (survival, anachronism, memory, becoming): the full complexity of temporality. This may very well counter our disciplinary desire for *Wissenschaft* (a positivist, chronological, diachronic system) with an experimental cartography: an interleaved diagrammatic mapping of an artwork as a 'bit of time in its pure state', that is, a critical approach to an artwork (a material-force) as an encounter that *deframes* historical time. An artwork breaks things open and yet composes itself as an immanence. It is and constructs an opening within linear, historical time. This is transmissibility. Thus an artwork constructs a relation between history and ontology (becoming, life, time as continuous multiplicity, an open-whole).

To rethink art history forces us to think how and why an artwork is what it *transmits*, that is, a 'nonsignifying passage', a *deframing* power that renders an opening within history. Within this opening, art historians confront a difficult lesson: 'Life is not your history'.²² Art is and opens us to a 'vertigo of immanence', a life that exceeds lived experience without abandoning art as an end-in-itself because, as Deleuze repeatedly states, 'thought and art are real, and disturb the reality, morality, and economy of the world'.²³ To study art history, then, is to use its history against itself; it is to understand that there are always statements and visibilities, forms of expression and forms of content, at once. This knowledge entails an art history that expands upon a 'narrowly historical point of view of before and after in order to consider time' because time as such is a 'coexistence that does not exclude before and after but *superimposes* them'.²⁴ In a sense, Deleuzian becoming (life, time as such) transverses history without being confused with it. As Deleuze and Guattari write, 'what History grasps of the event is its effectuation in states of affairs or in lived experience, but the event in its becoming, in its specific consistency, in its self-positing, escapes History' because 'History [interpretation] is not experimentation, it is only the set of almost negative conditions that make possible the experimentation of something that escapes history'.²⁵ Transmissibility

²¹ Lampert, p. 66.

²² Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues II*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, London and New York: Continuum, 2006, p. 15.

²³ The phrase a 'vertigo of immanence' is from Deleuze and Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, p. 48. The concluding quotation is from Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, p. 60.

²⁴ Deleuze and Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, p. 58.

²⁵ Deleuze and Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, p. 110.

is art historical experimentation with ‘something that escapes history’, namely time as such.

Lastly, while I certainly agree with Moxey’s thesis about art history needing to be able to think temporality more intelligently and creatively, I disagree with how he went about presenting that thesis in this book. For instance, Moxey briefly discusses the Japanese photographer Hiroshi Sugimoto, but only Sugimoto’s photographs of wax figures. Moxey entirely misses that Sugimoto holds that photography is the movement of time; it is never about stasis but rather intensities and singularities. Sugimoto’s images are not memories (not a representation of a former present or perception), but rather they embody mechanism (the action) of the passage and preservation—the durational experience of time itself.²⁶ Moxey would have been wise to reflect on Sugimoto’s theater series, which he began in 1975. Sugimoto had an idea: ‘Suppose you shoot a whole movie in a single frame? The answer: You get a shining screen’. So to actualize this idea he sat in the back of a cinema, set up his full format 8 x 10 in camera and fixed the shutter at its widest opening and his camera to its greatest depth of focus. It remains as such—shutter open—for the duration of the film. So the experience of the entire film—all of those moving images, all the people in the theatre—is all rendered absent, deframed, but what is composed is a radiant white rectangle illuminating the interiors of these extraordinary, disappearing historical movie theaters.

Sugimoto creates movement-images, ones that reveal an immanent event unfolding, and in doing so it complicates and explicates the actual with its virtual dimension. This suggests that in the poetic stillness of Sugimoto’s photographs we must become attentive to the movement, the vitality, and dynamism within them. He often says that he wants to see the way a camera does because it is outside of himself; it is another world. It is all about an encounter between forces and forms—a sensory becoming—that touches an intimate exterior. We encounter immanent image-movements—a kind of subjectless viewpoint, an event taking place so slowly that it seems as if nothing at all is happening and yet right before our eyes and in between our speech a sensory-event is being transmitted whether or not art historians choose to encounter it.

A haunting refrain to end: ‘To render Time sensible is the task common to the painter, the musician, and sometimes the writer. It is a task beyond all measure or cadence.’²⁷

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²⁶ Sugimoto works in series: dioramas, theaters, seascapes, or twentieth-century architecture. In addition, he eschews all artificial and digital means. Thus he uses only ambient light and nothing is digitally altered before the final print is made.

²⁷ Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, translated by Daniel W. Smith, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, p. 54.

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